




SPECIAL EDITION

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
JAN 93

SOMALIA



OPERATIONS
OTHER
THAN
WAR

**CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED (CALL)
U.S. ARMY COMBINED ARMS COMMAND (CAC)
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS 66027-7000**



FOREWORD

JANUARY 1993

This publication is for the forces deploying to Somalia to provide humanitarian assistance to the population under Operation RESTORE HOPE.

This Special Edition Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) publication introduces Somalia, provides insights into operations other than war, highlights major preventive medicine lessons, provides Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) for the soldier and presents Somali customs. The information in this Special Edition does not replicate that presently found in doctrinal publications. It is not intended to serve as a program to guide the conduct of operations and training. Rather, this newsletter is designed to highlight information and lessons that are applicable to the unique environment offered by the Somali humanitarian assistance experience.

The Somali effort poses many unique challenges not faced by our military forces in recent times. Organized governmental activities at the city and national levels do not exist. Security for civilians and food supplies is in constant jeopardy. The ability to supply necessary food to the starving citizenry is negligible or totally nonexistent. Warring clans, disease, the lack of sanitation and death are daily consequences associated with the extinction of the Somali governmental infrastructure. War, famine and anarchy have combined in Somalia to create an atmosphere that is both tragic and surreal.

CALL thanks those commands and agencies who have shared their insights and experiences. This information and TTP are provided for your use and dissemination. If your unit has identified other relevant lessons or information, please share them with the rest of the U.S. Army by contacting us at DSN 552-2255 or 3035. Comments concerning this newsletter should be addressed to Commander, Combined Arms Command, ATTN: ATZL-CTL, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-7000.

TRAINING EXCELLENCE - THE WINNING EDGE!

WILLIAM L. NASH

Brigadier General, USA

Deputy Commanding General

for Training

SOMALIA

OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

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The Secretary of the Army has determined that the publication of this periodical is necessary in the transaction of the public business as required by law of the Department. Use of funds for printing this publication has been approved by Commander, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1985, IAW AR 25-30.

Unless otherwise stated, whenever the masculine or feminine gender is used, both are intended.

NOTE: Any publications referenced in this newsletter (other than the CALL newsletters) such as ARs, FM's, TMs, must be obtained through your pinpoint distribution system.

**LOCAL REPRODUCTIONS OF THIS NEWSLETTER ARE
AUTHORIZED AND ENCOURAGED!**

CHAPTER I

AN INTRODUCTION TO SOMALIA

LOCATION AND BORDERS:

The Somali Democratic Republic lies on the east coast of Africa, with Ethiopia to the northwest and Kenya to the west. There is a short frontier with Djibouti. Somalia has a long coastline on the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden, forming the "Horn of Africa." All borders are arbitrary lines drawn during colonial times that ignore ethnic boundaries. None of these borders has been formally accepted by Somalia.

CLIMATE:

Somalia has a generally arid and tropical climate, determined principally by the northeast and southwest monsoonal winds and transitional periods known as tangambilis. There are two wet seasons: the gu, beginning in March and extending into May and sometimes June, and the dayr, the shorter wet season in October and November. Alternating with these wet seasons are two dry seasons, the jilal from December or January to March, dominated by hot, dry, dusty winds, and the haggaa, from the beginning of June to August. The haggaa is the hottest season of the year when temperatures may soar to 120 degrees F. The temperatures are moderated along the coast by cooling sea breezes. The average mean temperatures are 85 to 105 degrees F in the north and 65 to 105 degrees F in the south.

Most of the country receives less than 20 inches of rain annually, but some of the northern parts receive less than 2 inches. Severe droughts are common. The inland plains, particularly the Hual, have little surface water except in seasonally filled basins.

CITIES AND GEOGRAPHY (see map of Somalia):

The capital is Mogadishu. It has an estimated population of 500,000. The other major urban centers are Merca (70,000), Hargeysa (50,000), Berbera (45,000), and Jowhar (20,000).

Topographically, there are four natural divisions: the Gahan, the northern highlands, the Ogo, including the Mudug Plain, and the Somali Plateau, including the Haud. In general there is only limited contrast among these regions.

The northern coastal plains, which stretch from the Gulf of Tadjoura along the Gulf of Aden into Mijirtein region, are known as the Guban (burned land) from its semiarid and parched condition. Inland, this coastal strip gives way to the rugged mountain ranges that extend from Ethiopia to the tip of the Horn at Cape Guardafui, the easternmost point of Africa. This range contains the country's highest point, Surud Ad, 2,408 meters. The mountains descend to the south through a region, known as the Ogo, consisting of shallow plateau valleys, dry watercourses and broken mountains. This region merges into an elevated plateau and then continues into Central Somalia as the Mudug Plain, whose eastern section is known as the Nugaal Valley. This region merges imperceptibly in the vast tilting Haud Plateau, with an average elevation of 900 meters in the center, itself a part of the larger Somali Plateau. The region between the Juba and Shebeli Rivers is low agricultural land; southwest of the Juba River to the Kenyan border is low pasture land.

The country has only two permanent rivers, the Juba and Shebeli, both originating in the Ethiopian Highland and flowing into the Indian Ocean. The Shebeli has a total length of 2,000 km. It runs parallel to, and north of, the Juba through southern Ogaden to Balad, about 30 km from the Indian Ocean, where it turns southwest and, after about 270 km, disappears in a series of marshes and sandflats. During exceptionally heavy rains the Shebeli breaks through to the Juba farther south and then enters the sea. The largest seasonal streams in the north are the Daror and Nogal.

THE PEOPLE:

Somalia has one of the most homogeneous populations in Africa with 85 percent of its people belonging to Hamitic stock and 14 percent to the Bantu stock. As a result of intermixture, 98 percent of the people are described as Somalis. The Somalis are united by language, culture, and religion as well as by common descent. All Somalis trace their origin to two brothers, Samaal and Saab, said to have been members of the Arabian tribe of Quraysh, to which Muhammad belonged. The descendants of these two brothers constitute six clan families or tribes. The Dir, the Darod, the Isaq, and the Hawiyah make up an estimated 75 percent of the population and belong to the Samaal line. The Rahanweyn and the Digil belong to the Saab line. The Samaal are nomadic or seminomadic pastoralists, while the Saab are farmers and sedentary herders.

Relationship among clans and subclans is based on the principle of contracts (or heers). Clans are usually associated with given territory defined by the circuit of nomadic migration. The territories of neighboring clans tend to overlap which often results in occasional conflicts. Clans have ceremonial heads known as soldaans (or sultans) or bokors, but their internal affairs are managed by informally constituted councils known as shirs, of which all adult males are members. Interlineage or inter-clan allowances are known as diapaying groups, or groups that accept the burden of paying blood compensation (dia) for homicide (tribal retribution/an eye for an eye). Traditionally, every Somali belongs to a diapaying group, and there are over 1,000 of them in the republic. These groups are also important social and economic units and function as mutual-aid associations and political blocs. Saab clans are subdivided into three subclans, each called a gember (or stool), whose affairs are managed by leading elders called gobweins. The Saab are more heterogeneous than the Samaal and have assimilated some non-Somali elements.

There are also a number of despised groups who are believed to have inhabited the country before the arrival of the Somalis. Known as Sab among the Samaal and as Bon among the Saab, they follow so-called inferior occupations such as hunting, blacksmithing, weaving, tanning, and shoemaking. The most numerous of these groups are the Midgaan, the Yibir, the Tumul, the Dardown, the Gaggab, and the Madarrala.

Along the Indian Ocean coast and in the valleys of the Juba and Shebeli Rivers are groups known as habasho, believed to be descendants of Negro slaves. Many of these groups, such as the Gobawein, the Helai, the Tunni Torre, the Shidle, the Rer Issa, the Kabole, the Makanne, and the Gosha, have been partially Somalized. Also along the coast live the Bajun, who display Indonesian traits, the Swahili-speaking Amarani and the primitive Boni and Eile.

Ethnic aliens include some 35,000 Arabs, 3,000 Europeans, and 800 Indians and Pakistanis. There are also over 500,000 refugees from Ethiopia, most of whom are ethnic Somalis living in Somalia.

LANGUAGE:

The national and official language is Somali, a Cushitic language with dialectal differences that follow clan divisions. Of the several dialects, the most widely used is common Somali, spoken by Somalis not only within Somalia, but also in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti. The other dialects are regional, such as Central Somali and Coastal Somali, but all dialects are mutually intelligible.

Most Somalis have some knowledge of Arabic, and educated Somalis have some familiarity with Italian and English.

RELIGION:

The state religion is Islam, and the majority of Somalis are Sunni Muslims. There is a small Christian community, mostly Roman Catholics.

RIVAL FACTIONS:

These are the six major factions that have turned Somalia into a collection of armed camps:

SOMALI NATIONAL MOVEMENT

Leader: Abdul Rahman Tur, in alliance with a committee of clan elders.

Manpower: 6,000 in 1988.

Equipment: Smaller militias in the north have armored vehicles, artillery, anti-aircraft guns, light arms.

Clan: Isaak.

SOMALI SALVATION DEMOCRATIC FRONT

Leaders: General Mohammed Abshir and Colonel Yusuf.

Manpower: Several thousand armed men.

Equipment: Some armored vehicles, anti-aircraft guns, maybe some artillery, light arms.

Clan: Darod (Majretain branch).

AIDEED FACTION, UNITED SOMALI CONGRESS

Leader: General Mohammed Farah Aideed.

Manpower: Several thousand armed men.

Equipment: Some armored vehicles, artillery, anti-aircraft guns, light arms.

Clan: Hawiye (Habar Gadir subclan).

ALI MAHDI FACTION, UNITED SOMALI CONGRESS

Leader: "Interim President" Ali Mahdi Muhammad.

Manpower: 5,000 or less armed men.

Equipment: A few armored vehicles, antiaircraft guns, maybe some artillery.

Clan: Hawiye (Abgal subclan).

SOMALI NATIONAL FRONT

Leader: General Mohammed Said Hersi.

Manpower: A few thousand armed men.

Equipment: Several dozen armored vehicles, artillery, antiaircraft guns, light arms.

Clan: Darod (Marehan branch).

SOMALI PATRIOTIC MOVEMENT

Leader: Colonel Omar Jess.

Manpower: A few thousand armed men.

Equipment: Some armored vehicles and other heavy weapons.

Clan: Darod (Ogadeni branch).

TRADITIONAL HOLIDAYS:

The following dates are traditional holidays in Somalia:

| | |
|------------|------------------------------------|
| 1 January | New Year's Day |
| 25 March* | Id al-Fitr, end of Ramadan |
| 1 May | Labor Day |
| 1 June* | Id al-Adha, Feast of the Sacrifice |
| 26 June | Independence Day (Northern Region) |
| 30 June* | Ashoura |
| 1 July | Independence Day |
| 30 August* | Mouloud, Birth of the Prophet |

(*Note: These holidays are dependent on the Islamic lunar calendar and may vary by one or two days from the dates given.)

RECENT HISTORY:

Following is a brief synopsis of recent Somali history. (A more detailed study is presented at Appendix A.)

*** JULY 1, 1960**

Independence; merger of British Somaliland Protectorate and the Italian Trusteeship Territory of Somalia.

*** OCTOBER 26, 1969**

Maj. Gen. Mohammed Siad Barre takes power in a bloodless coup.

Somali Democratic Republic founded.

Comes under the influence of the Soviet Union.

*** 1977-1978**

Changes to a pro-U.S. government.

Ogaden War with Ethiopia.

*** 1987-1989**

U.S. interest in Somalia declines.

*** January 27, 1991**

President Siad Barre is toppled and escapes to Kenya.

*** 1991 until the present**

Civil War between Clans for control of country and secession of old British Somaliland from the Republic of Somalia.

CHAPTER II

OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

(EMERGING DOCTRINE)

(EXTRACTED FROM THE DECEMBER 1992 DRAFT OF FM 100-5)

INTRODUCTION:

The Army has participated in non-combat operations in support of national interests since its beginning. Thus operations other than war are not new to our Army. Their pace, frequency, and variety, however, have quickened in the last three decades. Today the Army is often required, in its role as a strategic force, to protect and further U.S. National interests at home and abroad in a variety of ways other than war.

Operations other than war may precede or follow war. They may be conducted in conjunction with wartime operations to complement the achievement of strategic objectives. They may support a combatant commander's forward presence operations or a U.S. ambassador's country plan. They are designed to promote regional stability, maintain or achieve democratic end-states, retain U.S. influence and access abroad, provide humane assistance to distressed areas, and protect U.S. interests. The National Command Authority (NCA) employs Army forces to such ends in support of our national military strategy. This serves to preserve and promote American democratic values peacefully. It minimizes the need for combat operations by defusing crises and nurturing peaceful resolution of contentious issues.

The Army conducts such operations as part of a joint team, and often in conjunction with U.S. and foreign government agencies. Operations other than war are intrinsic to a combatant commander's peacetime theater strategy or an ambassador's country plan. The total Army is involved daily in operations other than war.

Operations other than war will not always have peaceful results. Determined opponents may resort to fighting or other aggressive acts in an attempt to defeat our purposes and promote theirs. Although rules of engagement may often be restrictive, all military forces retain the intrinsic right of self-defense. Applying overwhelming combat power, normally our desire in wartime, may not be feasible if it complicates the process toward our stated objectives.

PRINCIPLES OF OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR:

Army warfighting doctrine has long been based on well-established principles of war. Operations other than war also have principles which guide our actions. For those operations other than war which involve our forces in direct combat, the principles of war apply. Some, such as the principles of objective and security, apply to both combatant and noncombatant operations. Unity of command requires some modification and is explained later. These three principles must be supplemented with three other principles well suited to operations other than war.

The relative application of each principle will vary depending on the specific operation. The principle of patience, for example, will impact more on long-term nation assistance than during a short-term noncombatant evacuation mission. The commander must always balance these principles against the specific requirements of his mission and the nature of the operation. The principles of operations other than war are:

OBJECTIVE

UNITY OF EFFORT

LEGITIMACY

PATIENCE

RESTRAINT

SECURITY

OBJECTIVE

Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective.

This principle also applies to operations other than war. Each separate operation must be integrated with every other to contribute to the ultimate strategic aim. It is critical that all commanders understand the strategic aim, set appropriate objectives and ensure they contribute to unity of effort with other agencies.

UNITY OF EFFORT

Seek unity of effort toward every objective. The principle of unity of command in war also applies to operations other than war, yet must be adapted to meet special challenges. In operations other than war, commanders may answer to a civilian chief, such as an ambassador, or may themselves employ the resources of a civilian agency. Since operations other than war often "marry" agencies which are not used to working with each other, command arrangements may often be loosely defined. This arrangement causes commanders to seek an atmosphere of cooperation rather than command authority to achieve objectives of unity of effort.

LEGITIMACY

Sustain the willing acceptance by the people of the right of the government to govern or of a group or agency to make and carry out decisions. Committed forces must sustain the legitimacy of the operation and of the host government. Legitimacy derives from the perception that constituted authority is both genuine and effective and employs appropriate means for reasonable purposes. If committed forces resolve an immediate problem within a nation or region, but detract from a legitimacy of the government in so doing, they may have acted detrimentally against long-term, strategic aims.

PATIENCE

Prepare for the measured, protracted application of military capability in support of strategic aims. Operations other than war may be of short duration or protracted. Because the underlying causes of confrontation and conflict rarely have a clear beginning or a decisive resolution, it is important that commanders carefully analyze the situation and choose to apply action at the right time and place. The Army must balance its desire to attain objectives quickly with sensitivity for the long-term strategic aims and restraints placed on the operation.

RESTRAINT

Apply appropriate military capability prudently. The action of soldiers and units are framed by the disciplined application of force, including specific Rules of Engagement (ROE). The use of excessive force could adversely affect efforts to gain and maintain legitimacy and impede the attainment of both short- and long-term goals.

SECURITY

Never permit hostile factions to acquire an unexpected advantage. The presence of U.S. forces in nations around the world may provoke a wide range of responses by factions, groups, or other forces of an unfriendly nation. Regardless of the mission, the commander must protect the force at all times. The intrinsic right of self defense from the unit to the individual level applies to all operations.

ACTIVITIES IN OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR:

The activities which ensue in operations other than war can occur unilaterally or with other military operations. These actions can take place at different times or simultaneously in different places. Operations other than war include, but are not limited to, the following:

NATION ASSISTANCE

SECURITY ASSISTANCE

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND DISASTER RELIEF

SUPPORT TO COUNTERDRUG OPERATIONS

PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

ARMS CONTROL

COMBATTING TERRORISM

SHOWS OF FORCE

ATTACKS AND RAIDS

NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS (NEOs)

PEACE ENFORCEMENT

SUPPORT FOR INSURGENCIES AND COUNTERINSURGENCIES

SUPPORT TO DOMESTIC CIVIL AUTHORITY

NATION ASSISTANCE: It is the principal peacetime activity designed to support the host nation's efforts to promote development, ideally through the use of host-nation resources. It must be supportive of both the ambassador's country plan and the Commander in Chief (CINC)'s regional plans. The goals of nation assistance are to promote long-term stability, develop sound and responsive democratic institutions, develop supportive infrastructure, promote strong free-market economics, and provide an environment that allows for orderly political change and economic progress.

SECURITY ASSISTANCE: It is a dynamic activity during peacetime consisting of the groups of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (amended), the Arms Export Act of 1976 (amended) and other related statutes. Through security assistance programs, the U.S. provides defense materiel, military training, and defense-related services by grants, loan, credit, or cash sales to further our national policies and objectives.

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND DISASTER RELIEF: Humanitarian assistance operations provide emergency relief to victims of natural or man-made disasters when initiated in response to domestic, foreign government or international agency requests for immediate help and rehabilitation. Disaster-relief operations include activities such as refugee assistance, food programs, medical treatment and care, restoration of law and order, damage and capabilities assessment, and damage control (to include environmental cleanup or other programs such as fire fighting).

SUPPORT TO COUNTERDRUG OPERATIONS: Military efforts support and complement, rather than replace, the counterdrug efforts of other U.S. agencies, the states, and cooperating foreign governments. The commitment of military resources will always remain consistent with our national values and legal framework. Army participation in counterdrug operations will normally be in support of law enforcement agencies.

PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS: These operations support diplomatic efforts to maintain peace in areas of potential conflict. They stabilize conflict between two belligerent nations and, as such, require the consent of all parties involved in the dispute. The U.S. may participate in peacekeeping operations when requested by the UN, regional affiliations of nations, in cooperation with other unaffiliated countries, or unilaterally. The peacekeeping force deters violent acts by its physical presence at violence-prone locations.

ARMS CONTROL: It focuses on promoting strategic military stability.

COMBATTING TERRORISM: The Department of Defense fulfills a supporting role to the Department of State, Department of Justice, and Department of Transportation to combat terrorism. There are two major subcomponents of combatting terrorism: antiterrorism and counter-terrorism. During peacetime, the Army combats terrorism primarily through antiterrorism - passive defensive measures to minimize vulnerability to terrorism. Antiterrorism complements counter-terrorism, which is the full range of offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism. Counter-terrorism is an activity occurring in conflict and war; antiterrorism occurs across the full scope of Army operations.

SHOWS OF FORCE: This is a mission carried out to demonstrate U.S. resolve in which U.S. forces deploy to defuse a situation that may be detrimental to U.S. interests or national objectives. Shows of force lend credibility to the nation's commitments, increase regional influence, and demonstrate resolve.

ATTACKS AND RAIDS: The Army conducts attacks and raids to create situations that permit the seizing and maintaining of political and military initiative. Normally, the U.S. executes attacks and raids to achieve specific objectives other than gaining or holding terrain. Attacks by conventional ground, air, or special operations forces acting independently or in concert are used to damage or destroy high-value targets to demonstrate U. S. capability and resolve to achieve a favorable result. Raids are usually small-scale operations involving swift penetration of hostile territory to secure information, temporarily seize an objective or destroy a target. Raids are followed by a rapid, preplanned withdrawal. These operations also occur in war.

NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS (NEOs): These operations relocate threatened civilian noncombatants from locations in a foreign country or host nation. They may involve U.S. citizens whose lives are in danger, selected host-nation citizens or third-country nationals.

PEACE ENFORCEMENT: This is a military operation in support of diplomatic efforts to restore peace between hostile factions which may not be consenting to intervention, and may be engaged in combat activities. Peace enforcement implies the use of force or its threat to coerce hostile factions to cease and desist from violent actions. Units conducting peace enforcement, therefore, cannot maintain their objective neutrality in every instance. They must be prepared at all times to apply elements of combat power to restore order, separate warring factions, and return the environment to conditions more conducive to civil order and discipline.

SUPPORT FOR INSURGENCIES AND COUNTERINSURGENCIES:

At the direction of the National Command Authority, U.S. military forces may assist either insurgent movements or host-nations' governments opposing an insurgency. In both cases, the military instrument of U.S. national power predominantly supports political, economic, and informational objectives.

SUPPORT TO DOMESTIC CIVIL AUTHORITY: When appropriate governmental authority directs the armed forces to assist in domestic emergencies within the continental U.S., the Army has primary responsibility. Army units support disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, counterdrug, antiterrorism, and similar operations.

CHAPTER III

TACTICS, TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES (TTP) IN SUPPORT OF OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

TOPIC: MINES.

DISCUSSION: Mine education for soldiers deploying to foreign countries is one of our greatest challenges. There are over 2,700 different types of mines in the world today. The most commonly used mines in Third World countries are nonmetallic antipersonnel mines.

LESSON(S): The combat engineer is not always available to clear mines. Devise a program of drills for extracting troops from mined areas and rehearse them. All soldiers need to know how to identify, mark, and report the presence of minefields.

TOPIC: MINE AWARENESS.

DISCUSSION: Land mines are a constant threat during many operations other than war. The mine or suspicious object immediate action drill is to **WARN THOSE IN THE IMMEDIATE VICINITY, DETERMINE LIMITS OF THE MINE FIELD, MARK THE LIMITS OF THE MINEFIELD, REPORT TO HIGHER, and AVOID.** In areas which may be mined, always move with your eyes open and treat with suspicion any object, natural or artificial, which appears out of place in its surrounding. If a soldier is wounded from a mine, use the following casualty immediate action drill. One person clears a route to the casualty. **LOOK, PROBE, DETECT.** Clear the area immediately around the casualty. Administer essential first aid. Drag casualty away from minefield using cleared route. Administer additional first aid. Evacuate the casualty ASAP.

LESSON(S):

- * Expect constant changes in local techniques.
- * Never disarm a landmine; report its location through your chain of command.
- * Do not move over the most obvious and easiest ground without checking it for mines first.
- * Be careful when tired.
- * Never pull, stack, or cut any wire, taut or slack, without first examining both ends. It is preferable that you do not touch the wire while examining it.
- * Ensure the lead vehicle proofs route of march. Use sand bags, flak vests, steel plates or lumber to protect crew and limit the number of personnel in the vehicle.

TOPIC: TACTICAL MOBILITY.

DISCUSSION: Light infantry units do not have enough vehicles for soldiers to travel great distances across open terrain. Since the area of operations in Somalia is large and will require convoy security for relief supplies, there will be a need to provide transportation to ground units. During Operation PROVIDE COMFORT (humanitarian assistance in Northern Iraq), the Joint Task Force (JTF) used aviation assets in a show of force role. This lessened the need for soldiers to be on the ground. Use of aviation assets in an escort role for relief convoys may be a way to ensure they reach their destination.

LESSON(S): During Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, units reallocated vehicles to form mobile infantry companies. Careful allocation of 2 1/2- and 5-ton assets must be planned to move large number of troops. HMMWVs can be used to move troops and provide security at the same time, but must be converted to troop carriers by removing the canvas and installing troop seats.

TOPIC: CHECKPOINTS.

DISCUSSION: Checkpoints are often scenes of violence or have the threat of violence. Leaders must take this into consideration and provide appropriate instructions to personnel who man these points. The Rules of Engagement must be clear, but flexible to accommodate rapid changes in any situation that may develop. During Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, a technique was used called a flying checkpoint." Mobile units, usually consisting of mounted infantry, combat engineers, and TOW vehicles, overwatched by attack helicopters, moved forward to key intersections in areas where armed Iraqi or guerrilla fighters were known to operate and set up hasty roadblocks to disrupt unauthorized or unwanted military activity. This mission always required designating soldiers to detain and search intruders, a sizeable element to overwatch the checkpoint, air cover on station, mobile mortar support, and a quick reinforcement force of TOW and infantry carriers that could extract or reinforce the flying checkpoint. Leaders should also ensure that checkpoints are designed so that only the minimum number of soldiers are exposed at any given time and that they are covered by automatic weapons when they are exposed.

LESSON(S): Be imaginative while performing in an operation other than war; develop tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) which can be applied to the situation to help accomplish the mission and restore hope to a desperate people. It is imperative that reinforcement and counterattack plans be made and rehearsed. Units during other peacekeeping operations have developed situational exercises to train soldiers on checkpoint procedures. Included are a few examples of these situational exercises:

SITUATION

- * Receive Sniper Fire
- * Projectiles Thrown
- * Imminent harm
- * Civilian Casualty
- * Drive-by Shooting

RESPONSE (A TECHNIQUE)

Take cover; employ smoke; protect wounded; identify location of sniper; REPORT; respond IAW ROE

REPORT; protect self and others; do not throw objects back

Protect yourself and others; use force IAW ROE; REPORT

REPORT; provide first aid

Take cover; REPORT; respond with force IAW ROE

NOTE: Execute response IAW the JFT ROE.

TOPIC: SITUATIONAL TRAINING CONSIDERATIONS.

DISCUSSION: Units will encounter situations for which they are normally not trained. These situations will present challenges to the leaders and generate confusion and stress for soldiers to deal with. Each unit should develop a training program to familiarize soldiers with anticipated problems they might encounter. These situational exercises can easily turn into battle drills for each unit. Some examples of training considerations are:

- * An appeal is received for medical assistance.
- * A civilian criminal is apprehended.
- * A crowd mobs a food distribution truck or center.
- * A land mine is discovered.
- * A dead body is found.
- * A non-government organization (NGO) individual asks for medical treatment.
- * A NGO individual asks for transportation on a military vehicle.

LESSON(S): Develop situational training exercises to prepare soldiers for unexpected problems or dilemmas. The unit commander must prepare the proper responses for his soldiers. These responses are method of expressing the commander's intent for the operation. Turn the responses into battle drills so that unexpected situations become routine operations for the soldier.

TOPIC: RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROE).

DISCUSSION: Soldiers must know and understand the ROE. The degree of force used must ONLY be sufficient to achieve that task at hand and prevent, as much as possible, loss of human life or serious injury. Leaders must ensure that soldiers are not limited by the ROE in their ability to defend themselves.

LESSON(S):

- * Develop and issue a card that outlines the ROE to all soldiers.
- * Keep the ROE realistic, simple, and easy to understand.
- * Do not chamber a round unless you are prepared to fire IAW the ROE or ordered to do so.
- * Do not tape over magazines to keep soldiers from accidentally chambering rounds.

TOPIC: DO's AND DON'Ts.

DISCUSSION: As a member of an organization which represents both the United States and the United Nations, your conduct, self-discipline and bearing will have a great influence on the success of the mission.

LESSON(S):

DO:

- * Be impartial.
- * Be tactful; use common sense and discretion.
- * Be inquisitive and observant.
- * Maintain a high standard of military bearing. (Don't wear bandanas or "drive-on rags".)
- * Make efforts to identify the local customs and obey all local laws.
- * Know the ROE.

DON'T:

- * Discuss operations, plans, intentions, or techniques in the presence of unauthorized personnel.
- * Discuss or comment on the opposing forces except in the performance of duty.
- * Discuss religion or politics.
- * Discuss the composition, role, and employment of friendly forces.
- * Have commercial dealings with local forces.

TOPIC: ROUTE RECONNAISSANCE.

DISCUSSION: To compensate for a lack of detailed maps, it is best to reconnoiter areas in advance of a convoy movement. If at all possible, guides should return to the main element at the completion of the reconnaissance to help the unit follow the route to the remote sights in the country. Deviation from planned routes can cause lengthy delays in needed supplies. Route reconnaissance provides a means to check trafficability of the roads. There are few hard surface roads in Somalia, and many of them are not well maintained. Trails crisscross the landscape and make reading a map difficult. Except for a few road signs, routes of march are not marked.

LESSON(S): Good route reconnaissance will improve the movement of supplies.

TOPIC: VEHICULAR SURVIVAL.

DISCUSSION: Military vehicles operating in Somalia need a higher degree of self-sufficiency than would normally be expected because of the environmental extremes. Another consideration is the civil war which has been raging in Somalia for a number of years. Reports from Somalia show that there are a large number of land mines present. Most are not marked, and, therefore, they will be a hazard that vehicles may encounter. Precautions that can be used to protect the soldiers riding in vehicles include lining the floors of the vehicles with layered sandbags.

LESSON(S):

* Equip vehicles with the following:

OVE, to include a small general tool kit

Flashlight and highway reflector

Fire extinguisher

Compass, binoculars and maps

Communications equipment

Shovel and tow rope or cable (at least 25-feet long)

Five gallons of water per vehicle

Personal food, clothing, and equipment

Siphoning hose (1/2 inch outside diameter by 6 feet) and funnel

Slave cables (one for each group of vehicles)

Jack support plate (one foot by one foot piece of metal)

Consumables, to include oil, radiator hoses, fan belts, heavy duty tape, air and fuel filters

Spare tire for HMMWVs

* Layer sandbags in troop-carrying compartments of vehicles to protect personnel from landmines.

* Travel in pairs, file a movement plan and monitor times of arrival and departure.

TOPIC: SOMALIA MAPS.

DISCUSSION: Somalia maps from the Defense Mapping Agency (DMA) vary in scale from 1:100K to 1:500K and are limited in supply.

LESSON(S): Maps are a significant problem in every operation on terrain where U.S. forces do not routinely operate. During Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, units made their own maps using GPS.

TOPIC: INSTALLATION SECURITY.

DISCUSSION: As commanders establish base camp areas and move into work facilities, they must balance their security measures with the type and level of threat posed by the groups in their area. This will apply both in the relative security of forward operating bases and at assigned facilities within cities. Further information is available in FM 100-37, TERRORISM COUNTERACTION, and Joint Pub 3-07.2, JOINT TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES FOR ANTI-TERRORISM.

LESSON(S): Security problems or shortfalls have contributed to the failure of force protection programs during terrorist attacks against U.S. interest in the Middle East since the 1983 Beirut bombings. Suggestions:

- * Remember barrier systems were unreliable; vehicle access controls were inadequate. Use additional security measures, such as vehicles, to block high-speed avenues of approach.
- * Do not use solely host-nation personnel to provide perimeter security of any facility.
- * Make critical physical security improvements by installing additional barriers to screen high-risk targets.
- * Ensure that the ROE does not limit the ability of the soldier to defend himself or the facilities.
- * Sensitive work areas must not be located in portions of buildings vulnerable to explosives.

TOPIC: PERSONAL AWARENESS.

DISCUSSION: The single most proactive anti-terrorism measure is individual awareness-by soldiers on guard, while moving individually near or within the cantonment area, and while operating as a unit. Soldiers must look for things out of place, for example, packages left unattended, the same car parked near the front gate for an extended period of time, or the same person standing on a street corner daily. When combined with appropriate physical security measures, individual awareness and actions will defeat the terrorist plans.

LESSON(S): The following procedures have proven effective in operations other than war where a significant terrorist threat existed:

- * Reinforce individual security awareness by reminding soldiers to report suspicious activities and out-of-place objects.
- * Utilize a tactical versus an administrative posture when moving off post as a unit or during individual travel.
- * Limit access to information about planned events, to include personnel movements and recreational activities.
- * Employ security measures in an unpredictable, random fashion, including security checks outside perimeters.
- * Maintain an adequate response force.
- * Ensure soldiers understand the ROE.
- * Impose substantial limitations on off-post travel.
- * Employ helicopters during hours of darkness, to conduct random patrols along perimeters.
- * Ensure soldiers remain alert, do not establish a routine, and keep a low profile.

CHAPTER IV

PREVENTIVE MEDICINE FOR THE SOLDIER

GENERAL: There is no reason to fear the Somali environment, and it should not adversely affect your morale if you are prepared for it, provided you take certain precautions to protect yourself. Remember that there is nothing unique about living in the arid coastal climate of Africa; native tribesmen have lived in this region for thousands of years.

TOPIC: COMMUNICABLE DISEASES.

DISCUSSION: Communicable diseases are illnesses that can be transmitted from one person to person or from animal to person. These diseases are caused by: direct contact with infected person(s), exposure to bodily discharges, bites of animals, insects and rodents, air, food, water and milk products. Communicable diseases can be broken down into five different categories. They are: respiratory diseases (common cold and pneumonia), intestinal diseases (dysentery, cholera, typhoid, paratyphoid fevers), insect-borne diseases (malaria, typhus, yellow fever, dengue), sexually transmitted diseases (syphilis, gonorrhea, chancroid, AIDS), and miscellaneous diseases (tetanus, rabies, dermatophytosis, tuberculosis). Above all, PERSONAL HYGIENE is the most important factor in the prevention of communicable diseases.

LESSON(S):

* Control the source of the disease through:

- Isolation of the sick person (quarantine)
- Treatment

* Control means of transmission:

- Properly ventilate living quarters
- Purify water
- Provide mess sanitation
- Properly dispose of body waste
- Control disease-carrying insects
- Practice good personal hygiene

TOPIC: RESPIRATORY DISEASES.

DISCUSSION: Respiratory infections account for the highest incidence of disease in the Army. While troops are affected, the highest rates of infection occur in personnel unfamiliar with the surrounding conditions.

LESSON(S): The difficulty in the prevention and control of respiratory diseases lies in the fact that most individuals are susceptible to them. Another problem is that the person transmits the disease before he realizes that he is infectious. The most important control measures to prevent respiratory diseases are:

- * Separate all known cases from healthy persons.
- * Provide quarantine and surveillance of contacts
- * Immunize
- * Avoid overcrowding (minimum 55 square feet of floor space in sleeping areas)
- * Practice good personal hygiene

TOPIC: PERSONAL HYGIENE.

DISCUSSION: Personal hygiene is the practice of health rules by the individual to safeguard his own health and the health of others. Carelessness of one member of a unit in regard to personal hygiene may lead to disease that may incapacitate the entire unit. Leaders must check soldiers daily to ensure that they are performing their personal hygiene. Personal hygiene includes, but is not limited to: washing face and hands, shaving, changing uniform (or at least socks and underwear), brushing teeth, and combing hair.

LESSON(S):

*** Individual:**

- Understand and continually apply personal measures
- Seek needed medical care
- Do not resort to self-treatment

*** Medical:**

- Conduct instruction in personal hygiene
- Conduct inspections of facilities and troops
- Provide medical treatment

*** Commanders:**

- Provide and maintain facilities
- Ensure the practice of personal hygiene through inspections
- Deploy with adequate buckets and soap so soldiers can wash personal clothing until laundry facilities are established
- Deploy with Australian showers

TOPIC: POTABLE WATER.

DISCUSSION: Safe potable water is essential to the Army. Water that is not properly treated can transmit such diseases as typhoid and paratyphoid fevers, bacillary dysentery, cholera, poliomyelitis, and common diarrhea. In some areas, water may also be the means of transmitting infectious hepatitis, schistosomiasis, and amoebic dysentery. Lessons from Operation DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM showed that units should use a planning factor of at least 7 gallons of water per soldier per 24-hour period.

LESSON(S): Treat the individual water supply with one iodine tablet per a quart-size canteen if the water is clear, two tablets if the water is cloudy. Let stand 5 minutes with the cap loosened, and shake to permit leakage to rinse the thread around the neck. Tighten cap and let stand for 20 minutes. Calcium hypochlorite may be used. Add one ampule in one-half canteen cup of water, let it dissolve, then pour one canteen cap of the solution in the canteen, shake it and let stand for 30 minutes.

WATER CONTAINERS:

The best containers for small quantities of water (5 gallons) is plastic water cans. Water in plastic cans will be good up to 72 hours, compared to metal which will only be good for 24 hours. However, you should change the water in your canteen at least every 24 hours. Water in trailers, if kept in the shade, will last up to 5 days. If the temperature outside exceeds 100 degrees F, the temperature of your water must be monitored, and when it exceeds 92 degrees F, it should be changed, as bacteria will multiply. If not changed, you will end up with a case of diarrhea. Placing ice in the containers will keep the water cool. If you do put ice in the water trailers, it must be removed before the trailer is moved as the floating ice may destroy the protective lining of the trailer.

TOPIC: MALARIA.

DISCUSSION: Malaria is a serious disease which is spread through the bite of the female anopheles mosquito.

LESSON(S): To protect soldiers, units should:

- * Destroy mosquitoes and control breeding areas by draining standing water.
- * Screen troop areas.
- * Locate camps away from infested areas.
- * Use sprays and aerosol dispensers, NSN 6840-00-253-3892 and NSN 6840-00-823-7849.
- * Ensure soldiers use netting at night.
- * Ensure soldiers wear protective clothing.
- * Ensure soldiers use chemical repellents.
- * Ensure soldiers take anti-malaria medication.

TOPIC: HEAT INJURIES.

DISCUSSION: The most frequently encountered types of heat injury are heat exhaustion and heat cramps. Less common, but of greater significance, is heat stroke. Causes of most heat injuries are the loss of salt and water from the body, failure of the sweat mechanism with resulting increase of body temperature (heat stroke).

Heat cramps are primarily caused by excessive loss of salt from the body. The symptom is extremely painful contraction of the voluntary muscles, especially in the abdomen.

Heat exhaustion is caused by excessive loss of water and salt from the body. The symptoms include profuse perspiration, pallor of the skin, low blood pressure and other manifestations of peripheral circulatory collapse. Soldiers may also complain of headache, mental confusion, drowsiness, extreme weakness, vomiting, and visual disturbances.

HEAT STROKE IS A MEDICAL EMERGENCY. Symptoms are extreme high body temperature, total absence of perspiration or sweating and skin which is red and hot to the touch. The individual is usually in a profound coma. Heat stroke is a breakdown in the body's heat-regulating mechanism. Individuals who have not been acclimatized are especially prone to heat stroke.

LESSON(S): Prevention of heat injury involves the application of measures for increasing the resistance of exposed persons and reducing the exposure as much as practicable. Following are ways to prevent heat injuries:

- * Encourage soldiers to drink water; thirst is not a good indicator of a heat injury.
- * Encourage proper salt intake -do not use salt tablets.
- * Gradually acclimatize soldiers to hot climates.
- * Ensure personnel maintain their best physical condition.
- * Tailor work schedules to fit the climate.
- * Protect soldiers from the environment by ensuring they wear loose clothing to permit air circulation.
- * Take frequent rest breaks - in the shade if possible.
- * Educate personnel to recognize early signs, take appropriate action, and apply effective first aid.

TOPIC: FIELD SANITATION.

DISCUSSION: The role of field sanitation (AR 40-5, FM 21-10) is to aid the unit in protecting the health of troops. Field sanitation is concerned with the basic responsibilities of:

Personal hygiene and protective measures

Water supplies

Mess sanitation

Waste disposal

Insect and rodent control

Troop education

LESSON(S): Methods for field sanitation include the following:

*** Garbage or Rubbish Disposal:**

Burial

Incineration

*** Liquid Waste Disposal:**

Soakage Pits

Soakage trenches

Evaporation Beds

*** Body Waste Disposal:**

Cat-Hole latrine for marches

Straddle trench for 1- to 3-day bivouac sites

Deep pit latrine for temporary camps

Burn-out latrines

Soakage pits for urinals

TAKE LIME WITH YOU!

Latrines must be located at least 100 meters from unit messes and at least 100 meters from any water source. Garbage must be buried at least 100 feet from any water source.

CHAPTER V

KNOWLEDGE OF SOMALI CUSTOMS

(DO's AND DON'Ts IN SOMALIA)

TOPIC: DOs AND DON'Ts.

DISCUSSION: The following guidance is provided to assist you in your understanding of Somali customs and society:

GREETINGS:

DO:

- * Shake hands whenever you meet or bid farewell to a Somali.
- * Always offer your right hand; the left hand symbolizes uncleanness and is used for personal hygiene.
- * Rise to show respect whenever an important person enters the room.
- * Be aware that it is customary for Somali men to greet each other with a hug and a kiss on the cheek. This is a sign of friendship.

DO NOT:

- * Use Somali greetings (spoken or gestured) unless you are sure how to use them correctly.

CONVERSATION:

DO:

- * Open conversations with small talk.
- * Maintain eye contact.
- * Place your feet flat on the floor if you are sitting on a chair, or fold them under you if you are sitting on the floor.
- * Demonstrate verbal skill. Verbal facility is highly valued in Somali society. If you can recite a poem or a tongue-twister, you will win esteem for your skill.
- * Avoid arguments.
- * Avoid political discussions.
- * Bring photographs of your family to show during conversations.

DO NOT:

- * Show impatience or undue haste.
- * Ask direct or personal questions, especially about female family members.
- * Criticize a Somali directly. This will cause him to lose face and respect for you.
- * Patronize or talk down to a Somali, even if he does not speak English very well.
- * Do not move away from a Somali who stands "close" to you during conversation. It is customary for a Somali to stand about one foot away.

HOSPITALITY:

DO:

- * If given a gift, give a gift in return (at a later date) of slightly lesser value.
- * Thank your host profusely for his hospitality and good conversation. Plan to return the hospitality.
- * Accompany your guest outside the door or gate when he leaves.

DO NOT:

- * Feel obligated to bring a gift. If you do bring a gift, make it a gift for the children.
- * Praise too much any possession of your host; he may give it to you. If he does, you are expected to give something in return.
- * Appear anxious to end a visit.

RELIGION:

DO:

- * Understand and respect the devotions of Muslims.
- * Respect the requirement for Muslims to fast from sunrise to sunset during the holy month of Ramadan. In 1993 Ramadan corresponds to a period from about 22 February to 30 March. Following Ramadan is the festival known as Eid AL Fitr, which is celebrated for three days after Ramadan ends.

DO NOT:

- * Enter a mosque unless invited. If invited, remove your shoes before entering.
- * Pass in front of a prayer rug while a Muslim is in prayer.
- * Take photographs of a Muslim while he is in prayer or stare at them while praying.
- * During the holy month of Ramadan eat, smoke, or drink in public from sunrise to sunset or offer food, beverages, or tobacco products to Muslims.

LESSON(S): Understanding Somali customs and society will assist in mission accomplishment.

TOPIC: "KHAT," THE SOMALI DRUG OF CHOICE.

DISCUSSION: Khat is also known as miraa, kat, gat, chat, or Arabian tea, after the Middle Eastern habit of toasting khat leaves and steeping them in hot tea. The active ingredient in khat, cathinone, is related to amphetamine in structure and effect. Khat chewing induces at least two kinds of psychotic reactions. Khat keeps the user awake for hours and most Somali gunmen use it. This may lead to many incidences of violence during early morning hours. Khat is readily available in Somalia.

LESSON(S): Be aware of the effects of Khat. Do not use it because it is illegal, and it will inhibit your ability to accomplish your mission.

TOPIC: COMMON SOMALI CONVERSATIONAL PHRASES.

DISCUSSION: The following Somali conversational phrases are provided for your use. A more comprehensive listing can be found in a pamphlet, "Surviving in Somalia," from the Foreign Language Center, Defense Language Institute. The words and phrases provided here are first in English, then in Somali, and then their pronunciation is given.

| ENGLISH | SOMALI | PRONUNCIATION |
|--------------------------|-------------------------------|---|
| Yes/No | HAA/MAY | ("HA/MY") |
| We Are American Military | WAXAAN NAHAY | ("WAHAN NAHY EEDAMADA CIDAMADA MARAYKANKA") |
| We Are Here To Help You | INAAN INDIN CAAWINO AYAAN | ("IN AN EEDIN AWENO AYAN HALKAN OO CHOGNA") |
| What Do You Need? | MAXAAD DOONAYSAA? | ("MAHAT DOANAYSA?") |
| Give me | I SII | ("ISEE") |
| Wait Here | WAA KU SUG | ("HALKEM KOOSOOK") |
| Come With Me | I SOO RAAC | ("ESSORRA") |
| Stop! | JOOGSO! | ("CHOK SO!") |
| Hands Up | GACMACHA KOR U TAAGA | ("GAMAKA KOROOTAG") |
| Lie Down | JIFSO | ("CHEEF SO") |
| Face Down | WAJIGAAGA DHULKA SAAR | ("WICHEE GAGA LULKASAR") |
| Get Up | STAAG | ("KA") |
| Be Quiet | AAMUS | ("AMMOOS") |
| Good Morning | SUBAX WANAAGSAN | ("SUBAH WANAKSIN") |
| Good Night | HABEEN WANAAGAN | ("HABAYN WANAKSIN") |
| Hello | ISKA WARAN | ("ISKA WARRAN") |
| Good-Bye | JAAW | ("CHOW") |
| Put Your Weapon Down! | HUBKAAGA OHIG! | ("HOOPKAGA DIG!") |
| Leader | HOGAAMIYE | ("HOGAMEEYA") |
| Family | REER | ("RAYN") |
| Refugee | QAXOOTI | ("KAHOATEE") |
| Do You Speak English? | MA KU HADLI KARTAA INGIRIISI? | ("MAKO HADLEE KARTA INGREEZEE?") |
| What Is Your Name? | MAGACAA? | ("MAGA-A?") |
| Who Is In Charge? | YAA KA TALIYA HALKAN? | ("HALKAN YAHOOKOOMA?") |
| East | BARI | ("BAREE") |
| West | GALBEED | ("GALBAYT") |
| North | WAQOYI | ("WAKOYEE") |
| South | KOONFUR | ("KONFOORN") |
| Down | HOOS | ("HOAS") |
| Village | TUULO | ("TOOLO") |
| Today | MAANTA | ("MANTA") |
| Which Way? | HAGGEE? | ("HAGAY?") |
| Come | KAALAY | ("KALAY") |

ENGLISH**SOMALI****PRONUNCIATION**

| | | |
|---|---------------------------|------------------------------|
| Danger! | KHATAR! | ("KHATAR!") |
| Do Not Drink The Water! | BIYAHA HA CABIN! | ("BIYAHA HA-ABIN!") |
| Mine Field | GEGI MIINAYSAN | ("GEGI MEENAYSAN") |
| Keep Out! | KA DHEEROW! | ("KA DERO!") |
| Warning! | DIGIIN! | ("DIGNEEN!") |
| How Is The Road? | WADDADU WAA SIDEE? | ("WADDADOO WA SIDAY?") |
| Get In | SO GAL | ("SOAGEL") |
| Don't Be Frightened | HA CABSANIN | ("HA APSANIN") |
| Are You Carrying A Weapon? | HUB MA SIDATAA? | ("HOOB MA SIDATA?") |
| Don't Fire | HA RIDIN | ("HARIDIN") |
| Don't Shoot Us | HA NA TOOGAN | ("HADAHGLIN") |
| You Are a Prisoner | MAXBUUS BAAD TAHAY | ("MAHBOOS AYAT TAHAY") |
| Stay Where You Are | HALKAAGA JOOG | ("HALKAGA CHOAG") |
| Where Are You From? | XAGGEE BAAD KA TIMID? | ("HAGAY BAT KATIMIT?") |
| Go | TAG/BAX | ("TAG") |
| (* NOTE: Don't say BAX/TAG to elderly people because it tells them to leave the village.) | | |
| Line Up | SAFTA | ("SAFF TA") |
| Doctor | DHAKHTAR | ("DAKHTAR") |
| Medicine | DAAWO | ("DAWO") |
| Show Me | ITUS | ("ITOOS") |
| Are There Any Dead? | CID DHIMATAY MIYAA JARTA? | ("IDD DIMATAY MIYA CHIRTA?") |
| Boil Your Water | BIYIHIINA ISKA KARIYA | ("BIYIHEENA EESKA KAREEYA") |
| Wash Your Hands | QACMAHIINA DHAQA | ("KAMIHEENA DAKA") |
| Thank You | MAHADSANID | ("MAHATSENIT") |
| Bread | ROOTI | ("ROATEE") |
| Camel Milk | CAANO GEEL | ("ANO GEL") |
| Rice | BARIIS | ("BAREES") |
| Flour | BUR | ("BOOR") |
| Drink | CAB | ("AB") |
| Eat | CUN | ("OON") |
| Don't Be Afraid | HA CABSAN | ("HA ABSAN") |
| Food | CUNTO | ("OONTO") |

LESSON(S): Knowing and understanding some basic conversational phrases will assist in mission accomplishment.

APPENDIX A

RECENT HISTORY

Somalia's modern history began in the late 19th century when various European powers began to trade and establish themselves in the area. In the colonial partition of Africa, Somali peoples were divided: the French occupied what is now Djibouti, the British occupied what is now northern Somalia (British Somaliland), Italy took the east and south, and other territories where Somali-speakers lived became part of Kenya and Ethiopia.

After World War II, in Article 23 of the 1947 Peace Treaty, Italy renounced all rights and titles to Italian Somaliland. In accordance with treaty stipulations, on 15 September 1948, the Four Powers referred the question of the disposal of former Italian colonies to the United Nations (UN) General Assembly. On 21 November 1949, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution recommending that Italian Somaliland be placed under an international trusteeship system for 10 years, with Italy as the administering authority, followed by independence for the Italian Somaliland. In 1959, at the request of the Somali Government, the UN General Assembly advanced the date of independence from 2 December to 1 July 1960. The new Republic was born with a tripartite coalition government, with two principal northern political parties merging with the Italian Youth League (IYL), the ruling party in the former Italian areas in the south. The government was carefully balanced and representative of the major ethnic groups, but the country was soon divided by ethnic jealousies. Moreover, the different administrative languages and legal and tax systems in the former British protectorates made unification difficult. However, popular commitment to irredentism, extending Somalia's borders to include the Somalis of Djibouti, Kenya, and Ethiopia, obscured the internal divisions, though this led to an unsuccessful war with Ethiopia in 1963-64.

In 1969, the military seized power under Maj.-Gen. Muhammad Siad Barre. Under Siad, Somalia began building up its military. Since its rival Ethiopia was a close ally of the United States, Somalia turned to the Soviet Union for aid, and in 1975 permitted the USSR to build a major base at Berbera on the Gulf of Aden. But as Ethiopia turned Marxist after the deposition of Haile Selassie in 1974, Somalia found Moscow increasing its aid to Addis Ababa. Somalia expelled its Soviet advisors, and in 1977, launched open attacks in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, claimed by Somalia.

With massive Soviet and Cuban aid, Ethiopia repulsed the Somali offensive. Somalia leaders claimed that U.S. promises of aid had not been kept. Meanwhile, Somalia continued to actively support the Western Somali Liberation Front inside the Ogaden, while insisting all its regular forces had withdrawn. After the Ogaden War of 1977-78, and its cutoff of aid from the USSR, Somalia turned to the west. It was admitted to the Arab League and Saudi Arabia and other conservative states began providing aid to counter Soviet influence in Ethiopia. Egypt and Iran also provided aid, with many weapons procured from Spain. Some U.S.-built anti-aircraft weapons were transferred, apparently by Saudi Arabia.

A coup attempt, allegedly backed by the USSR, was put down in 1978. Siad was by then firmly in power, despite some difficulties with his own army and severe economic problems caused by the Sahel drought, the war, and an enormous refugee problem as Somalis fled the Ogaden.

Politically, Somalia abandoned its revolutionary rhetoric and sided more and more with conservative Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia; it declined to follow the lead of Arab League countries breaking with Egypt after the 1979 Egypt-Israel peace.

By 1980, as the Iranian crisis forced the United States to look for new bases in the Middle East, previous Somali overtures were renewed, and the United States reached an agreement on base facilities at the Berbera Naval base and airfield and at the port of Mogadishu. In return, the United States was to extend some \$20 million in military credits and pay for upgrading the bases.

Internal difficulties in October 1980 led to the proclamation of a state of emergency and re-establishment of the Supreme Revolutionary Council.

Continued drought, and the huge refugee population, have made the Somali economy a disaster, but aid from Saudi Arabia off set some of the worst effects.

By 1981, a rebel group, the Somali Salvation Front (SOSAF) was operating against Siad with Ethiopian assistance and broadcasting anti-Siad propaganda from Radio Kulmis, based in Addis Ababa. SOSAF was based largely on the Mijerteyn tribal confederation of former British Somaliland, and a secondary aim, if not to supplant Siad, was the secession of the former British Territory, which resented the domination of leaders from the tribes of the former Italian zone. In late 1981, the Mijerteyn-dominated SOSAF joined with the Somali National Movement, backed by the Isaaq tribes, forming the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SOSDAF).

In early 1982, following SOSDAF successes along the border, the government reportedly executed a number of local officials, provoking mutinies by several military garrisons in the Northern Region. This reportedly was sparked by resentment of the Military Commander of the North, BG Mohammed Haji Gani, a member of Siad's southern Marehan tribal confederation. Extensive violence was reported in the key northern town of Hargeisa.

In March 1982, Siad reshuffled his cabinet, restoring power to First Vice President Colonel-General Mohammed Ali Samantar, who regained the Ministry of Defense after stepping aside the year before.

In April, there were reports of an attempted plot against Siad Barre by several key figures who had been dropped in the March reshuffle, including Gen. Omar Haji Mohammed, who had served as Acting Defense Minister during the period of Samantar's absence and had built up a power base of his own. Since Haji Mohammed and the other figures involved were members of Siad's own Marehan clan, this plot marked the first open opposition to his rule from his own tribal clan. Siad had run his government largely through trusted relatives and the clan members, including his brother, the Foreign Minister, and his son-in-law, Adbulle Suleiman.

The mutinies and plots led to new U.S. doubts about the stability of Somalia, and the arms sales promised in 1980 were not delivered until the crisis of July 1982.

At the end of June 1982, Somalia began to report Ethiopian attacks across the border, and by early July, claimed that Ethiopian forces had invaded Somalia's Central (Mudugh) Region in several places. SOSDAF claimed that the invasions were carried out by its forces, and Ethiopia denied involvement. When it became clear that the invaders were receiving Ethiopian air cover and using armored vehicles, the United States and Italy began deliveries of military equipment. The U.S. deliveries, some rushed from Diego Garcia, included small arms, radars, and Vulcan air defense gun systems ordered earlier. The United States was particularly concerned because a SOSDAF success, even if limited to the secession of the Northern Region, would end U.S. rights to the base at Berbera.

The SOSDAF, after achieving some solidarity in 1983, including a brief merger with the smaller Somali National Movement (SNM) Ethiopia-based leader Col. Abdullaa Yusuf, had apparently driven many of its fighters to the government side. Conversely, there were reports of desertions to the rebel side. Most notable was the defection of Siad Barre's Ambassador to the UAE to the SNM. Meanwhile, the SNM leadership was also changed, and the SNM emerged as the more effective opposition group.

An extensive reshuffling of both the Cabinet and the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party was carried out by President Siad in June 1984. The return of former National Security Service chief Ahmed Suleiman Abdulle to head the new Ministry of Interior indicated his likely return to power over the internal security apparatus. Meanwhile, the government made overtures for a restoration of ties with the USSR, despite Soviet backing of Ethiopia.

Heavy fighting between rebels and government forces was reported in October 1984 in the northern regions. The major city of Hargeisa and port of Berbera were both reportedly cut off by SNM attacks. As internal problems grew, the pressure to solve the external ones grew too. In May 1986, Foreign Minister Abdurahman Jama Barre met with Ethiopian government officials in the first stage of a peace process agreed to by the leaders of the respective nations.

The health of Siad had been deteriorating for years, and some reports indicated that he was suffering from liver cancer, but when he was involved in a traffic accident in May 1986, a competition began to see who would consolidate their power and possibly succeed him.

Siad's accident was severe enough that it was necessary to evacuate him to Saudi Arabia for treatment. The leadership vacuum that was created led to a scramble for control. Siad's family wanted to retain the position which it had gained and to counter moves by Ali Samantar, then Vice President and Defense Minister, to consolidate his power while Siad was being treated in Saudi Arabia. To prevent Samantar and his allies, primarily army units outside the capital, from taking control, Siad's family brought him back from Saudi Arabia only a month after the accident to prevent a takeover, even though Siad required the medical attention that could be best provided in Saudi Arabia.

Competition for power was not simply between Siad's family and Samantar, because Ahmed Suleiman Abdulle, the Interior Minister and Siad's son-in-law, was siding with Samantar. Abdulle's feud with the family focused on his conflicts with Siad's wife, Khadija, who was responsible for Abdulle being purged from his post in 1982. Abdulle approached Malash Mohammed, Siad's son, to see if he would plot to overthrow the government. Siad's return shortly after this was a sign of the family's insecurity.

The rivalry continued after Siad's return. In September, when the ruling Party was to renominate Siad to a new term as Chairman, Samantar arrived to give the President's speech only to find Siad there, who later presented part of his speech himself. In addition, Samantar had hoped to represent Somalia at the Non-Aligned Summit in New Delhi, but Siad's half-brother and Foreign Minister, Abdurahman Jama Barre, went instead.

Samantar's reputation included having only honest and efficient officials in the government. In addition, Samantar took the lead in discussions over the U.S./Somali defense relationship, placing him in a key position for support from both the United States and the military. The family's position was tied to its relationship with Siad and the predominance of the Marheran, although resentment existed within the tribe because of the perception that Siad had concentrated so much wealth with his own family and not throughout the tribe generally.

In January 1987, the power struggle took another turn with the announcement of the government's ruling body, the Politburo, concerning changes in the ruling party and the Cabinet. The insults were a victory for the family, but it was far from being a total victory. Samantar lost the Defense portfolio, kept the vice presidency, and was given the newly created, probably largely ceremonial, position of Prime Minister. No one was named to the vacant defense post. In addition, Mohammed Hashi Gani was chosen as one of the three newly named Deputy Defense Ministers, a further setback for Samantar as he was a close ally of the family. This was somewhat counterbalanced by two events: Abdulle was able to retain his Interior portfolio, and the family was unable to get Siad's half-brother, Foreign Minister Abdurahman Jama Barre, elevated to the Politburo of the SRSP.

Abdulle's political fortunes continued to rise. In a January 1988 reshuffle, Samantar remained Prime Minister, Hussein Kulmie Afrah became First Deputy Prime Minister and Inspector and Chief of Operations for Economic Affairs; Abdulle, Second Deputy Prime and Inspector and Chief of Operations for Social and Security Affairs; and Ahmad Mahmud Farrah, Third Deputy Prime Minister and Inspector and Chief of Operations for Political Affairs.

Further negotiations with Ethiopia led to the signing of a treaty formally ending its confrontation over the Ogaden. Internally, Somalia's military situation continued to worsen. Although individual reports from the war zones continued to be unreliable, a picture built up of major Somali National Movement successes in the north. A major offensive in May 1988 was followed by a steady run of attacks on government forces. The towns of Hargeisa and Burao fell under SNM control, and the government began bombing them regularly.

Somali military policy was devastating much of the area and driving it into famine. In November, the British Minister for Overseas Development, Brian Patten, managed to visit the Hartisheik refugee camp in northeast Ethiopia, where 400,000 refugees had fled from the fighting. He said that their physical state was better than that of the Sudanese refugees he had seen earlier, but they were clearly too frightened to go back until there was political change in Somalia.

The Somali government claimed there are 840,000 Ethiopian refugees in Somalia, most of whom crossed the border in 1977, but outside observers say the number may be as low as 400,000. The UN High Commission for Refugees has been providing aid for 10 years. In mid-1988, the Somali government began using UN relief supplies to recruit and feed refugees in Somalia and using them to fight for the government against the SNM. After six months of protests, the UN estimated that 140,000 had been recruited. On December 22, 1988, the UN High Commissioner, Jean Pierre Hocke, sent a letter to the Somali government insisting that food be permitted to enter through Djibouti and distributed to the refugee camps under UN supervision. UN officials halted the old system of shipping food through Berbera in Somalia and handing it over to Somali authorities.

At the end of January 1989, Prime Minister Samantar visited Washington as part of a diplomatic effort to get support for the government's efforts in the war and its attempts to salvage the economy. During his visit, reports surfaced that Somalia had acquired stocks of nerve gas from Libya but was refraining from using it. Relations between Libya and Somalia improved markedly in late 1988 and early 1989.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS:

The conflict between the SNM and government forces was still on-going in early 1990. Government forces had managed to recapture Hargeisa, but the area was still under continuous SNM attack.

On 20 April 1990, the SNM concluded the process of selecting its new leadership. Abd al-Rahnan Ahmad Ali replaced Muhiamed Rashid Haji Yasin as chairman of the SNM. Haji Yasin had held the post since September 1985.

In early May 1990, Somalia accused Djibouti of invading the village of Lawyacado near the northeaster border between the two countries. The Somali government said that the invaders were armed with heavy weapons, and that 36 villagers were killed in the attack. The Defense Minister of Djibouti described the reports as "pure lies."

As summer progressed, President Siad began to indicate that he would both be willing to talk to people claiming to be dissidents and to consider moves toward a multiparty system. Prime Minister Samatar had asked a technical team set up by the President to draft a series of constitutional amendments toward greater democratization of the political process by yearend. This plan was approved by the full Council of Ministers, but would not be submitted for popular approval. The security and stability of the country had been ensured.

In mid-July, 55 opponents of President Siad Barre who were arrested a month earlier for signing a manifesto condemning human rights abuses by the government were acquitted of sedition. The President also established a committee to hold direct or indirect peace talks with the opposition. He acknowledged that security in the country was poor.

Significantly, also in mid-July, the Council of Ministers endorsed the implementation of democratization of the country's political system with a new constitution to be put to a popular referendum on 31 October. Parliamentary and local government elections were set for 1 February 1991. Three weeks later, the Council unanimously approved a bill legalizing the multiparty system in the country.

On 3 September 1990, President Barre dismissed the entire government of Prime Minister Mohammed Ali Samantar, after accusing the government of being unable to resolve the country's political and economic problems. He named Mohammed Hanadle Madar from northern Somalia as Prime Minister. Madar's cabinet was approved by President Siad Barre the next day. Meanwhile, the SNM claimed the capture of the central regional capital of Dusa Maffeb.

In October the government agreed to temporarily implement a new constitution that would introduce a multiparty system. At the same time, Somalia's three guerilla groups, threatened with possible expulsion from Ethiopia, were reported to have begun to coordinate their fighting.

In May 1990, as the government began to crumble, a group of businessmen and intellectuals, who became known as the Manifesto group, published an antigovernment declaration. In September, in an effort to precipitate Siad Barre's departure, the United Somali Congress (USC), the Somali Patriotic Movement/Front (SPM), and the SNM decided to coordinate their military tactics to overthrow Siad Barre and form a coalition government. There were no public statements about political programs, and it is unlikely that any were discussed. Siad Barre's repression had been generally directed at clans. In any case, the immediate task was to oust Siad Barre, after which his adversaries agreed to hold a national conference to hammer out common policies and create an equal distribution of power.

During the last three months of 1990, Mogadishu and the whole of southern Somalia became a war zone as the campaign to dislodge Siad Barre escalated. In December of 1990 and January 1991, as USC and SPM forces closed in on Mogadishu, Siad Barre instigated fighting inside the city. The fiercest clashes occurred on December 30, with fighting between members of the Darod clan (many of whom were armed by Siad Barre) and the Hawiye clan. Thousands of civilians lost their lives, particularly those belonging to the Hawiye, the largest clan in Mogadishu. At the same time, Siad Barre opened negotiations with some members of the Manifesto group.

On 19 January 1991, USC forces under the command of General Aidid, a former soldier who led a USC faction that was based in Ethiopia, entered the city, forcing Siad Barre to flee in a tank to his home area of Gedo, on the border with Kenya. Three days later, without consulting the leaders of the other armed opposition groups, prominent members of the Manifesto group formed a government, with Ali Mahdi, a wealthy hotelier, as interim president. This move set the stage for the strife that has since devastated Mogadishu. Aidid, the SPM, and the SNM immediately rejected Ali Mahdi's appointment and refused to recognize his authority.

Fighting again broke out in September, but was contained after neutral clans came between the two USC factions with their armed vehicles and troops. Disputes continued, with each side menacing the other militarily. On 13 November, Ali Mahdi moved his forces close to Aidid's headquarters. Full-scale fighting erupted on 17 November when Aidid responded with a military strike on Ali Mahdi's troops.

In the course of 1991, the conflict between Aidid and Ali Mahdi became, in part, a battle between two subclans. The fighting surprised Somalis, since there are no appreciable religious, cultural, or other, differences between the two subclans. There is no history of interclan fighting within the Hawiye clan, nor is there any traditional enmity between Aidid's Habr Gidir subclan and Ali Mahdi's Abgal subclan. The current rivalry between the two results from the way in which first Siad Barre and then the two USC leaders have sought to manipulate clan loyalty to secure a political power base. This legacy of newly manufactured ethnic tension is one of the most damaging political developments in contemporary Somalia, once Africa's most homogenous nation. As the conflict continues, subclan loyalty, even subclan survival, is increasingly at stake, with the fear that the future may bring murderous retaliation against the losers. The fight is also fueled by money. In a poor and aid-dependent country, such as Somalia, control over the symbols of "legitimate" or "sovereign" government is more than a matter of status, it is a license to print money. The government not only literally manufactures bank notes, but also controls the exchange rate, foreign aid, and can run up debts on the national account--which can bring great personal fortunes to those in office. Ali Mahdi and his ministerial colleagues have lost most of their businesses and depend on holding office for future income. Similarly, General Aidid and his financial backers are banking on their share of the spoils if they should win.

THE NORTHERN SECESSION

Mogadishu is not the only trouble spot in Somalia. With Siad Barre's defeat, the SNM became increasingly dissatisfied with its alliance with the USC and the SPM. The lack of consultation by the USC and the SPM, and the failure to hold the long-promised national conference after the government's collapse, galvanized secessionist sentiment among the northern region's Isaaq clan, which is the SNM's support base. Isaaq discontent fed on many grievances, the ferocity of the 1988 war, and bitterness that none of the other main clans had condemned its savagery and had actually fought for the government and profited from the plunder of Hargeisa. There was also a deep-seated feeling that the north had been deliberately starved of development resources and that the introduction of Somali as the official language was partly, if not entirely, motivated by the determination to blunt the educational advantages enjoyed by the north as an English-speaking region.

Despite widespread support for secession among the rank and file, the SNM leadership was against it, since it was aware that winning international recognition would be difficult. Ali Mahdi's decision to take power strengthened the hand of the pro-secessionists who forced the decision on the leadership by arguing that a government dominated by southern groups would deny it a voice in a united Somalia. In May 1991, the Somali National Movement declared the independence of the Somaliland Republic (formerly British Somaliland). However, no country has officially recognized the Somaliland Republic.

The security situation in the north is rapidly deteriorating, compounded by dire economic problems and the many Issaqs who are fleeing the war in Mogadishu. A few humanitarian groups with limited resources work with indigenous organizations struggling to rehabilitate a region devastated by warfare and land mines. Hargeisa, to which most refugees from Mogadishu have returned, lies in ruins, with almost all its buildings destroyed. While there is no ideologically based opposition to the administration in Somaliland, its domination by the Isaaq-supported SNM has led to resistance from some members of non-Isaaq clans.

APPENDIX B

MINE THREAT

The land mine problem in Somalia is similar to that of other areas of Southern and Eastern Africa which have been scenes of recent political and military unrest. Overall the land mine issue in Somalia can be described as a general problem in the southern sectors of Somalia and a very serious one in the northern sectors of Somalia. Border areas where large numbers of refugees and displaced persons have traveled are also suspected regions of heavy minelaying. At least 300,000 mines have been emplaced in Somalia during the last few years.

In Somalia, unusual factors, not considered in land mine placement for normal military objectives, have also influenced the location of land mines and booby traps. Large numbers of refugees from Somalia are reported to be in camps in the surrounding countries such as Ethiopia and Kenya. Additionally, there has been a massive displacement of persons within Somalia. These factors in conjunction with famine, food distribution, political instability, and struggles for local control have influenced land mine use. As a result, land mines can be expected on travel routes to prevent movement of refugees (to, from, and within, Somalia). Recently placed and abandoned point minefields can be expected throughout the region. Few large minefields will be encountered. Large minefields will probably have only been emplaced around previously contested areas which have been considered important. An example is the area surrounding the city of Hargeysa. Large patterned minefields, exceeding 100,000 mines, have been emplaced in sections surrounding the city. Extensive booby trap activity has also been reported from Hargeysa.

The following table shows the place of origin, nomenclature, and features of known mines in Somalia.

| COUNTRY OF ORIGIN | NOMENCLATURE | FEATURES |
|----------------------------|---|--|
| BELGIUM | PRB M3 AL PRB M35 | NM, blast, AT, SFW NM, blast, AP |
| CHINA | Type 72 Type 72 ? | NM, blast, AT NM, blast, AP Blasting machine |
| CZECHOSLOVAKIA | PT-MI-BA II PT-MI-BA II (variation) PP-MI-SR-II | NM, blast, AT Metallic, blast, AT Bounding frag, AP |
| GERMANY | DM-11 | NM, blast, AT (caseless) |
| FORMER E. GERMANY | PMP-71 PPM-2 | Frag, AP Blast, AP |
| EGYPT | M/71 | Metallic, blast, AT, SFW |
| ITALY | V | Frag AP, stake |
| PAKISTAN | P2 Mk3 P2 Mk2 P2 Mk2 | NM, blast, AT NM, blast, AT NM, blast, AP |
| FORMER SOVIET UNION | TM-62 w/MVCH-62 TM-57 w/MVZ-57 TMN-46 w/MVM SFW TM-46 w/MVM PMD-6, PMD-6M POMZ-2, POMZ-2M PMN MUV-2 | Metallic, blast, AT Metallic, blast, AT Metallic, blast, AT, SFW Metallic, blast, AT Wooden, blast, AP Frag AP, stake Blast, AP TW fuze, delay armed |
| UNITED KINGDOM | Mk-2 ? | TW flare Shaped charges |
| UNITED STATES | M15 M7A2 M16A2 M14 C-4 | Metallic, blast, AT Metallic, blast, AT Bounding Frag, AP NM, blast, AP Plasticized Explosive |

* KEY: AP - Antipersonnel; AT - Antitank; NM - Nonmetallic; SFW -Secondary fuze well;
Frag - Fragmentation; TW - Trip wire

For a pocket-sized reference which provides color photos of the above-listed mines and a more detailed listing of the features for each of them, obtain Foreign Ground Weapons and Health Issues (U), December 1992, Foreign Science and Technology Center Somalia Handbook, by writing to Commander, US Army Foreign Science and Technology Center, ATTN: IAFSTC-PO, 220 Seventh Street, NE., Charlottesville, VA 22901-5396.

APPENDIX C

RELIEF ORGANIZATIONS

Relief efforts in Somalia have been crippled by widespread looting and violence directed toward relief workers and relief supplies. Armed gunmen prey upon beneficiaries of distributions of blankets and other non-food supplies. The areas covered by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are restricted by these security constraints as adequate supplies to cover all the needs cannot be brought in at once. The most experienced relief agencies in the world are working in Somalia, many of them with superior staff with long experience in relief under difficult situations: Iraq, Afghanistan, Sudan, Angola, Mozambique, Liberia, to mention only a few. The NGOs expatriate staffs are adequate for the size of programs now being administered. All NGOs employ large number of Somalis who have prior experience in relief operations. Many also speak English. A large pool of talented water, sanitation, irrigation, and agriculture engineers are also available and have been tapped by NGOs.

There are over 300 expatriated NGO workers in Southern Somali programs. NGOs have had difficulty recruiting staff for the Somalia emergency and express confidence that immediately upon security being restored, they will be able to increase staff quickly (about two weeks) to respond to expanded needs. Likewise, when the hiring of technical and security guards is no longer needed, NGOs will see an immediate increase in disposable funds for program implementation.

NGOs make strenuous efforts to understand the clan system and to ensure that resources are fairly distributed. Any neglect of this factor results in the death threats, looting, and other types of non-cooperation. NGOs, therefore, should be consulted for guidance and advice on selection of sites for every type of assistance.

NGOs have a long-term commitment to Somalia, as does the United Nations. Many of the NGOs now working there have been involved with programs in this region since the 1980s. They will remain long after the military has gone, and will have to deal with any negative attitudes that develop as a result of any misstep made by the military. Again, it is crucial to include the United Nation and NGOs in all planning that takes place in Somalia. NGO representatives should be included in all daily briefings.

Following is a list of some of the relief organizations participating in the Somalia relief effort:

Africare
440 R Street, NW
Washington, DC 20001

Air Service International
Box 3041
Redlands, CA 92373

American Friends Service Committee
1501 Cherry Street
Philadelphia, PA 19102

American Red Cross
Box 37243
Washington, DC 20013

CARE International
660 First Avenue
New York, NY 10016

Church World Service
Box 968
Elkhart, IN 46515

Doctors Without Borders, USA
USA 30 Rockefeller Plaza, Suite 5425
New York, NY 10112

International Medical Corps
5933 West Century Blvd., Suite 310
Los Angeles, CA 90045

Lutheran World Relief
390 Park Avenue South
New York, NY 10016-8803

Save the Children Fund
54 Wilton Road
Westport, CT 06880

UNICEF
331 East 38 Street
New York, NY 10017

U.N. World Food Program DC-1
1 United Nations Plaza
New York, NY 10017

World Vision
P.O. Box 1131
Pasadena, CA 91131